Dr.C.J.George
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I thought of sharing with readers my bitter experience, when a couple of fraudsters took me for a ride. These awkward incidents can happen to any one, but many will not divulge to others fearing ridicule. Most readers are acquainted with a variety of scams, in which victims are falsely led into divulging their bank details to fraudsters. The one in which I was involved is called Authorised Push Payment (APP). If you have been tricked into transferring money to the account of someone you do not know, you might have been the victim of what is known as APP fraud. I shall describe the circumstances leading to the loss of £25000 from my First Direct (subsidiary of HSBC) bank account and my subsequent battle with the law enforcement and other government agencies. Unlike other blogs, I need to include telephone conversations to move the plot leading to the scam.
I had heard that investing money in bonds is better than investing in bank accounts. I searched on line, and visited a website called, ‘comparethebondmarket.co.uk’ which I thought, was like ‘comparethehomeinsurance.co.uk’ . I opened the website which led me to various options on investing in bonds run by reputable companies. After careful consideration I felt the best deal was Goldman Sachs Dynamic Municipal Income Bond (9) offering 5% annual interest. I checked about municipal bonds and Goldman Sach online. These bonds are raised by debt ridden municipalities of America. The softly spoken salesman, with a London accent, introduced himself as Andrew Wolff and explained to me all the nitty gritty details of the bond market. He then sent by email, a brochure of Goldman Sach’s banking empire and a six page application form with the title head of Goldman Sachs, Dublin address, company registration number and FCA registration number.
The next three days I verified about the genuineness of Goldman Sach’s address and Dynamic Municipal Income Bond. On the third day I received a phone call from a roughly spoken person who introduced himself as Nigel Harman. He suggested that I apply early with a copy of my passport and utility bill, as they were about to close that series of bonds. I felt their conduct and the documentations were professional. In the form, I was asked to send the fund to a Barclays Bank account for my security, I filled and sent the form by email with an attachment for my identity. I transferred the £25000 through BAC system in the morning. I am in the habit of taking screen shots with my iPad, and as usual I did so, from the first visiting of ‘comparethebondmarket.co.uk’ to each step of the BAC transfer.
In the afternoon a Lady with an Indian accent, called ‘Priya’ contacted me and started on questions to verify my identity. I jot down the name of the caller and fragments of phone conversations in a note book kept on the coffee table. She told me that the call was about a recent transfer of fund. I grew suspicious of her and I did not divulge my personal details to her for the identity verification.. I disconnected the call, but she sent a text asking me to contact the security section of First Direct. Immediately I rang the bank, and it took17 minutes to talk to the customer service.
The next day, Andrew Wolff contacted me and told that Goldman Sachs had received the fund I had transferred. He assured me that I would get the receipt and documentation for the investment in Municipal bond within 10 days. I went to my daughter’s house in London on Saturday, 28/09/2019, and boasted to her, an investment banker, that I managed to get 5% return while she was only getting paltry 0.75%interest on her savings! She checked the email from Andrew Wolff and the website. She ascertained that it was a cloned website.
I immediately rang First Direct and spoke to a customer services lady called 'Jenny'. After waiting for a while, she assured me that the fund was not released but I could not believe her. She told she would reimburse the fund back into my account. But after ten minutes, she rang again and apologized, the money had gone. I wanted to talk to someone senior, she put me to 'Penny' in the investigation department. She told she would do her best to recover the fund and would immediately inform Barclays Bank. There was no records in the subsequent ‘subject access’ that she had immediately contacted Barclays bank to freeze the recipient account!
In the evening at about 11pm on 28/09/2019, I reported the scam to Action Fraud (police wing in charge of online scam) and spoke to an adviser for 45 minutes. As advised I cancelled my passport and applied for a new one. On 28/09/2019, First Direct bank froze my bank account as if I was the culprit. This caused untold misery in managing my account. On Monday, 30/09/2019, I reported the incident to Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). I complained to First Direct in writing, asking them to reimburse the fund in full as I felt it was their fault they did not put me through to security. More over, HSBC bank had signed up the voluntary code, on reimbursing APP scam victims.
I also contacted Barclays Bank head office, in London asking them to divulge the name of the account holder who received the fund. Barclays reported that the whole fund had been withdrawn. But they would not divulge the name of account holder and how the person withdrew the fund. I demanded ‘subject access’ (release of whole file) and phone conversation recordings from both banks, with a view to take legal action. I received £12500 and a cut off letter from First Direct on 29/10/2019, which was required for registering a complaint to Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS).
Soon after the incident, I had reported the incident to local police who registered a case, gave registration number, but suggested to report the matter to City of London Police Authority, which specialised in financial scams. I received a typical response from the Police that there are hundreds of thousands of similar scams, and they do not have resources to investigate all cases. I sent a letter to the home secretary, Preeti Patel, who replied that home office could not get involved in police operations. I have also reported the matter to National Crime Agency and Serious Fraud office, who sent stereotypical letters, sympathising with me, without getting involved. For the benefit of public awareness, I thought of divulging my victim experience to media swallowing my self respect. I approached BBC ‘Rip Off Britain’ and ‘Watch Dog’ television programmes. But they too had a surplus of stories like mine.
As FOS, took over 4 months to allocate an investigator, I contacted the local Member of Parliament (MP) to expedite the matter. At last an investigator took over who was fair and considerate in his approach. In another two months, he ruled in favour of me and asked HSBC to reimburse the remaining £12500 plus 8% interest by 13th October 2020. If First Direct did not pay, then the Financial Ombudsman would investigate independently and make final statutory order, which is binding and compliant by law. Until February 2021, the brazen First Direct bank did not pay and the matter was referred to the Ombudsman. The ombudsman fully agreed to the observations of the investigator and wrote to me that the bank will pay, but an order was not issued. This was to save HSBC from tarnishing the corporate image of HSBC on its gazette publication. At last one fine morning I found the the sum had been credited to my bank account.
Reflecting on the whole episode, still I have no idea who was the beneficiary account holder of Barclays bank. How did the culprits manage to buy a website ‘comparethebondmarket.co.uk’ and launch it on Google search? I do not know whether police can refuse to investigate on-line crimes, as conviction will be a deterrent to other would be criminals. I strongly feel baiting of the fraudster by the police could track down the culprit. Few internet fraudster convictions remain a reality not only in the UK, but also in most developed countries. May be readers of this blog can contribute to solve this epidemic of crime.
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